Biazzo Law Files Joint Supreme Court Amici Brief in Johnson v. Jacobson Second Amendment Carry Reciprocity Case with Huang Tiange
By Biazzo Law, PLLC
Updated September 23, 2026
Biazzo Law, through Corey J. Biazzo as counsel of record, has filed a Supreme Court brief of amici curiae with Huang Tiange in Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr. v. Bob Jacobson, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Public Safety, No. 26-255.
The case concerns the Second Amendment, interstate travel, public carry, and whether a State may make a nonresident’s ability to carry a firearm for lawful self-defense depend on whether that State recognizes the carry permit issued by another State.
Read the Huang–Biazzo Supreme Court amici brief here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/26/26-255/425274/20260922224415240_Huang%20Biazzo%20Brief.pdf
View the Supreme Court docket here:
This case also fits within the mission of the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program, which focuses on nonpartisan constitutional accountability, separation of powers, federalism, individual rights, judicial review, and lawful limits on government power:
Quick Answer: What Is Johnson v. Jacobson About?
Johnson v. Jacobson asks whether the Second Amendment permits a State to treat a lawful nonresident carrier differently based on the State that issued the person’s firearm carry permit.
The petitioner, Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., is a long-haul truck driver who travels across the country, including into Minnesota. He holds firearm carry permits from Florida and Georgia. Minnesota does not recognize permits from several States, including Florida and Georgia. As a result, when Johnson enters Minnesota, he alleges that he must unload and secure his firearm rather than continue carrying it for lawful self-defense.
The Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota’s reciprocity statute, viewed “standing alone,” did not regulate protected Second Amendment conduct. It treated permit reciprocity as a matter of interstate comity rather than a Second Amendment issue.
The petition asks the Supreme Court to review whether that approach is consistent with New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, and Wolford v. Lopez.
The Questions Presented
The petition presents two core questions:
Whether Americans must obtain a firearm license from each State to exercise Second Amendment rights across the Nation.
Whether state firearm license reciprocity statutes that do not recognize firearm licenses issued by all other States are valid under Bruen.
Those questions matter because millions of Americans travel across state lines for work, family, military service, business, and ordinary life. The practical question is whether an incorporated constitutional right can become territorially discontinuous every time a person crosses a state border.
This Is a Legal Issue, Not a Political One
Second Amendment cases are often discussed in political terms. This blog is not.
Biazzo Law’s analysis is legal and nonpartisan. The question is not whether any political party has the better firearm policy. The question is how courts should apply the Constitution.
The Second Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights. Like other constitutional guarantees, it must be interpreted through legal text, history, precedent, federalism, and the proper role of courts.
A government-oversight approach asks the same question regardless of the right involved:
Has the government acted within constitutional limits?
That question is not partisan. It is the rule of law.
What Did the Eighth Circuit Decide?
The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Johnson’s claim.
The court acknowledged that public carrying in Minnesota is conduct covered by the Second Amendment. But it separated Minnesota’s reciprocity statute from Minnesota’s broader carry prohibition and permit requirement. It then held that the reciprocity provision, standing alone, did not regulate arms-bearing conduct.
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Minnesota could require nonresidents to obtain a Minnesota permit and that interstate permit recognition depends on comity rather than the Second Amendment.
The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that this was the wrong framework.
The issue is not whether the word “reciprocity” appears in the Second Amendment. Constitutional provisions do not typically list every administrative mechanism a government may use to burden protected conduct. The relevant question is whether the complete legal regime burdens conduct protected by the constitutional text.
Here, the conduct is public carry for lawful self-defense. Johnson’s position is that Minnesota’s combination of a carry prohibition, permit requirement, and selective-recognition rule determines whether he may engage in that conduct without criminal exposure.
What Does the Huang–Biazzo Brief Argue?
The Huang–Biazzo brief supports the petitioner and asks the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
The brief makes three main points.
First, the Second Amendment secures a uniform national right that does not change at state borders.
Second, lower courts have reached interstate carry distinctions through shifting theories that do not provide a stable post-Bruen answer.
Third, this case is a clean procedural vehicle because it was resolved at the pleading stage on a legal threshold issue, not after a factual trial record.
The National Constitutional Baseline
The brief begins with the text of the Second Amendment: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”
The brief argues that “the people” refers to members of the national community and that nothing in the constitutional text makes the right depend on a person’s State of residence. A citizen who is part of “the people” in Georgia does not cease to be part of “the people” when crossing into Minnesota.
That does not mean States lose the ability to regulate firearms within constitutional limits. States may enforce firearm regulations that satisfy the governing constitutional test.
But state boundaries do not change the meaning of the Constitution.
That distinction is central to the brief.
Minnesota does not have to copy Georgia’s firearm code. But if Minnesota’s laws burden public carry by a nonresident who is part of “the people,” then the burden should be evaluated under the Second Amendment framework, not avoided by calling the issue comity.
Why Wolford Matters
The brief relies heavily on Wolford v. Lopez, where the Supreme Court stated that the Second Amendment has the same meaning in all parts of the United States.
That statement matters because Johnson’s case concerns the interstate consequences of a uniform constitutional baseline.
The Huang–Biazzo brief does not argue that Wolford automatically establishes universal permit reciprocity. It argues something narrower: if the Second Amendment has the same meaning nationwide, then a State cannot avoid constitutional scrutiny merely by describing the burden on public carry as an “exemption,” “comity,” or a matter of which State issued a permit.
The question is whether the State’s complete legal regime burdens protected conduct. If it does, the court should move to the historical inquiry required by Bruen.
What Bruen Requires
Under Bruen, courts ask whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the individual’s conduct. If it does, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and the government must justify the regulation by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that the Eighth Circuit stopped too soon.
The court accepted that public carry is covered by the Second Amendment. But instead of analyzing Minnesota’s complete regime under Bruen, it isolated the reciprocity provision and concluded that “reciprocity,” by itself, was not protected conduct.
The brief argues that this mistakes the regulatory mechanism for the protected conduct.
The protected conduct is bearing arms for lawful self-defense. Reciprocity is one mechanism through which Minnesota determines whether a nonresident may engage in that conduct.
What About State Licensing Authority?
The brief does not ask the Supreme Court to decide every licensing question.
It does not argue that every State must automatically recognize every permit issued by every other State at this stage of the case. It also does not challenge Minnesota’s general shall-issue permit system, which Johnson conceded for purposes of this litigation.
Instead, the brief asks the Court to decide a narrower antecedent question:
When a State’s carry prohibition, permit requirement, and selective-recognition rule together determine whether a nonresident may bear arms, may a court remove the recognition rule from the Second Amendment inquiry by calling it an exemption or comity?
The Huang–Biazzo brief says no.
If the Court agrees, it could grant certiorari, correct the framework, and remand for the historical analysis the Eighth Circuit did not conduct.
Why Interstate Travel Matters
The case is especially concrete because Johnson is a long-haul truck driver.
Interstate travel is not occasional for him. It is part of his occupation. A route may allow him to carry before reaching Minnesota, require him to unload and secure his firearm while traveling through Minnesota, and permit him to resume carrying after leaving Minnesota.
His citizenship does not change at the state line. His firearm does not change. His purpose—lawful self-defense—does not change. But the legal consequence changes based on geography.
The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that this is the kind of recurring interstate problem that warrants Supreme Court review.
The issue could affect truck drivers, traveling workers, military families, business owners, tourists, and others whose lives routinely cross state boundaries.
Why the Brief Critiques the “Comity” Theory
The Eighth Circuit compared firearm carry permits to professional licenses. States generally do not have to recognize another State’s license to practice law, medicine, or dentistry.
The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that this analogy confuses the credential with the constitutional right.
A professional license is permission created by state law to engage in a regulated profession. The right to keep and bear arms has a different source: the Constitution.
A carry permit may reflect regulatory vetting. But the permit does not create the underlying constitutional right. The brief argues that the nonextraterritorial character of professional licenses cannot decide whether an incorporated Bill of Rights guarantee applies to a lawful interstate traveler.
How Lower Courts Have Treated Similar Issues
The brief also explains why prior lower-court decisions do not supply a stable answer.
Bach v. Pataki came before Heller and McDonald and rejected a Second Amendment claim under the old rule that the Amendment did not bind the States.
Peterson v. Martinez involved a concealed-carry-only claim after the plaintiff waived a challenge to open carry and before Bruen displaced the preexisting two-step framework.
Culp v. Raoul sustained an interstate licensing distinction using intermediate scrutiny, which Bruen later rejected for Second Amendment cases.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in McCoy v. Jacobson used a new route: it avoided the historical inquiry by treating reciprocity as outside the Amendment at step one.
The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that this sequence shows a recurring issue surviving doctrinal changes. Further percolation may produce more labels, not clarity.
Why the Case Is a Clean Vehicle
The case was resolved on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). That matters because the issue is legal and threshold.
There is no trial record to parse. There are no credibility determinations. The question is whether the Eighth Circuit used the correct Second Amendment framework.
The brief argues that this clean posture allows the Supreme Court to correct the legal framework without resolving every firearm licensing issue in one case.
The Court could hold that Minnesota’s complete legal regime must be assessed under Bruen and remand for the historical analysis the Eighth Circuit never reached.
What Did the Second Amendment Foundation Amici Argue?
The attached brief filed by the Second Amendment Foundation, NRA, California Rifle & Pistol Association, Second Amendment Law Center, Minnesota Gun Owners Caucus, and Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms also supports the petitioner.
That brief makes three primary arguments.
First, it argues that historical firearm laws often included “traveler’s exceptions” allowing travelers to carry arms when local residents faced restrictions.
Second, it argues that the modern patchwork of state carry permit rules imposes heavy burdens on Americans who travel across state lines.
Third, it argues that Americans with carry permits are overwhelmingly law-abiding and that States should not treat licensed nonresidents as categorically dangerous merely because their permits were issued elsewhere.
The Huang–Biazzo brief does not duplicate that historical survey. Instead, it uses the traveler-history point more narrowly: interstate travel was not historically treated as extinguishing the underlying right to bear arms. That history reinforces the need to analyze Minnesota’s complete legal regime under Bruen rather than treating selective recognition as constitutionally invisible.
Why This Case Is Significant
This case is significant because it asks how the Second Amendment applies in a mobile nation.
Many constitutional rights are exercised across state lines. Americans travel for work, family, military service, business, education, health care, and ordinary life. When a right has been incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, States may regulate within constitutional limits, but they may not define the right itself out of existence at the border.
The case also asks whether courts may avoid Bruen by isolating one component of a larger regulatory scheme.
If a State imposes a carry prohibition, a permit requirement, and a selective-recognition rule, the practical effect of those provisions together determines whether the person may carry. The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that constitutional analysis should examine that complete regime.
What This Blog Does Not Say
This article does not argue that every firearm regulation is unconstitutional.
It does not argue that States lack all authority over public carry.
It does not argue that the Supreme Court has already held that every State must recognize every other State’s permit.
It does not offer political commentary about gun policy.
It summarizes a pending Supreme Court petition and a filed amici brief. The Court has not yet granted review or decided the merits.
Why This Fits the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program
This case fits within the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program because it involves constitutional limits on state authority, federalism, interstate citizenship, individual rights, and judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
Government oversight is not partisan. It is institutional.
The same rule-of-law principle applies regardless of the right at issue: when government burdens a constitutional right, courts must apply the correct constitutional framework.
Here, the Huang–Biazzo brief argues that the lower court should not have avoided Second Amendment scrutiny by treating Minnesota’s selective recognition rule as mere comity. If the complete legal regime determines whether a nonresident may carry, then the complete legal regime should be tested under the Second Amendment.
Key Takeaway
Johnson v. Jacobson asks whether the Second Amendment’s protection for public carry can be made to depend on state-by-state permit recognition.
The Huang–Biazzo amici brief argues that the right to keep and bear arms is a uniform national constitutional right, not a privilege that appears and disappears at state borders. The brief does not ask the Supreme Court to decide every licensing issue. It asks the Court to correct a threshold framework error: a court should not isolate a reciprocity provision from the carry prohibition and permit requirement that give it practical effect.
The petition should be granted so the Supreme Court can decide whether Minnesota’s complete legal regime must be analyzed under Bruen.
Frequently Asked Questions
What case did Biazzo Law file in?
Biazzo Law filed a Supreme Court brief of amici curiae with Huang Tiange in Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr. v. Bob Jacobson, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Public Safety, No. 26-255.
What is the case about?
The case concerns whether Minnesota may require a nonresident with Florida and Georgia carry permits to obtain a Minnesota permit before carrying in Minnesota, even though Minnesota recognizes some other States’ permits.
What Second Amendment issue is presented?
The core issue is whether a State’s selective firearm permit reciprocity rule burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment and must be analyzed under Bruen.
What did the Eighth Circuit hold?
The Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota’s reciprocity provision, viewed standing alone, did not regulate arms-bearing conduct and that permit recognition depends on interstate comity rather than the Second Amendment.
What does the Huang–Biazzo brief argue?
The brief argues that the Second Amendment secures a uniform national right, that the lower courts have used shifting theories to preserve interstate distinctions, and that this case is a clean vehicle for Supreme Court review.
Does the brief argue that every State must automatically recognize every permit?
The brief asks the Court to decide a narrower threshold question: whether a selective-recognition rule may be removed from Second Amendment analysis by calling it comity or an exemption when it operates with a carry prohibition and permit requirement to determine whether a nonresident may carry.
Why does Wolford matter?
The brief relies on Wolford v. Lopez for the principle that the Second Amendment has the same meaning in all parts of the United States. The brief argues that this national baseline should apply when a State’s law burdens interstate public carry.
Why does Bruen matter?
Bruen requires courts to ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct and, if it does, whether the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Huang–Biazzo brief argues that the Eighth Circuit improperly ended the analysis at step one.
What did the Second Amendment Foundation amici argue?
They argued that historical laws often included traveler’s exceptions, that modern state-by-state carry rules impose substantial burdens on interstate travelers, and that carry permit holders are overwhelmingly law-abiding.
Is this blog political?
No. This is legal analysis of a pending constitutional case. Biazzo Law’s position is nonpartisan and focuses on constitutional text, precedent, federalism, and judicial review.
Where can I read the Huang–Biazzo brief?
The filed Supreme Court brief is available here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/26/26-255/425274/20260922224415240_Huang%20Biazzo%20Brief.pdf
Where can I view the Supreme Court docket?
The Supreme Court docket is available here:
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