Biazzo Law Files Supreme Court Amici Brief in Holloway v. Brown Second Amendment DUI Disarmament Case
By Biazzo Law, PLLC
Updated September 28, 2026
Biazzo Law, through Corey J. Biazzo as counsel of record, has filed a Supreme Court brief of amici curiae with Huang Tiange in Jackson W. Holloway v. Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General of Washington, No. 26-300.
The case involves the Second Amendment, Washington firearm law, DUI-related misdemeanor convictions, conviction-based disarmament, and the continuing development of the Supreme Court’s text-history-tradition framework after Bruen, Rahimi, Hemani, and Wolford.
Read the Biazzo–Huang Supreme Court amici brief here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/26/26-300/425744/20260927214944153_Biazzo%20Huang%20Brief.pdf
View the Supreme Court docket here:
This case also fits within the mission of the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program, which focuses on nonpartisan constitutional accountability, individual rights, federalism, judicial review, and lawful limits on government power:
Quick Answer: What Is Holloway v. Brown About?
Holloway v. Brown asks whether Washington may impose a firearm-possession ban after a person has two qualifying DUI-related misdemeanor convictions within seven years.
The petitioner, Jackson W. Holloway, challenges Washington’s law under the Second Amendment. He argues that the State may not impose a broad firearm prohibition based on misdemeanor driving offenses without showing a historically comparable tradition of disarming people in that way.
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the law by a 5–4 vote and directed judgment for the State. Holloway then filed a petition for certiorari asking the United States Supreme Court to review the decision.
The Biazzo–Huang amici brief supports Holloway and asks the Court to grant review.
This Is a Legal Issue, Not a Political One
Second Amendment cases are often discussed in political terms. This blog is not.
Biazzo Law’s analysis is legal and nonpartisan. The question is not whether any political party has the better firearm policy. The question is how courts should apply the Constitution.
The Second Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights. Like other constitutional guarantees, it must be interpreted through text, history, precedent, federalism, and the proper role of courts.
A government-oversight approach asks the same question regardless of the right involved:
Has the government acted within constitutional limits?
That question is not partisan. It is the rule of law.
What Does the Washington Law Do?
Washington law makes it a felony for certain people to own, possess, control, or receive firearms.
As relevant here, Washington disarms a person after two qualifying “prior offenses” within seven years under the State’s DUI sentencing statute. The firearm disability does not automatically expire after the person completes a sentence. Instead, the person may petition for restoration only after meeting statutory conditions, including a multi-year period in the community without disqualifying events.
That matters because the case is not about carrying a firearm while intoxicated.
It is about a broader prohibition that reaches firearm possession generally, including possession in the home while sober.
What Is the Question Presented?
The petition presents this question:
Does Washington’s total ban on firearm possession following a second misdemeanor conviction within seven years for driving under the influence violate the Second Amendment?
That question is narrow but important.
It does not ask whether drunk driving is dangerous. It is.
It does not ask whether government may regulate the combination of alcohol and firearms. It may, within constitutional limits.
The question is whether this particular conviction-based firearm prohibition fits the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The Second Amendment Framework: Bruen, Rahimi, Hemani, and Wolford
Modern Second Amendment analysis begins with District of Columbia v. Heller, which recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, especially for lawful self-defense in the home.
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Court held that when the Second Amendment’s text covers the person and conduct, the government must justify its regulation by showing that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
In United States v. Rahimi, the Court upheld firearm disarmament for a person subject to a domestic-violence restraining order where a court had found a credible threat to another’s physical safety. Rahimi emphasized that the challenged law was temporary and tied to judicial findings.
In United States v. Hemani, the Court addressed federal disarmament of unlawful drug users and rejected historical analogies that did not match the modern law in who they targeted, why they operated, and how they burdened the right.
In Wolford v. Lopez, the Court emphasized that historical analogies must be close enough in both “how” and “why” to justify an inference that the modern restriction is constitutional.
The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that Washington’s law cannot be squared with Hemani and Wolford.
What Did the Washington Supreme Court Decide?
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the law.
The majority reasoned that Washington could disarm recidivist drunk drivers without an individualized assessment of dangerousness. It relied on three asserted historical traditions:
disarming groups deemed dangerous;
disarming people convicted of serious crimes;
and regulating the combination of alcohol and firearms.
The court acknowledged that none of those traditions might be sufficient alone, but held that they were sufficient when taken together.
The dissent disagreed. It argued that Washington had not identified a sufficiently analogous historical tradition and that the State had not shown the required connection between DUI-related convictions and firearm misuse.
What Did the Petition Argue?
The petition argues that the case has national importance because many jurisdictions regulate the relationship between alcohol-related convictions and firearm possession in some way.
It also argues that lower courts need guidance on conviction-based disarmament after Bruen, Rahimi, and Hemani.
The petition emphasizes that Holloway is not a felon and that his predicate offenses do not include violence, physical force, bodily injury, threatening behavior, or firearm misuse.
That posture matters. The petition argues that the case allows the Supreme Court to address conviction-based firearm restrictions without deciding every issue involving felony disarmament.
What Does the Biazzo–Huang Brief Add?
The Biazzo–Huang brief supports certiorari but focuses on issues the petition did not fully develop.
The brief makes four core arguments.
First, Washington defines the disarmed class by borrowing a definition from its DUI sentencing statute. The brief argues that this creates the same kind of mismatch the Supreme Court identified in Hemani, where the government’s disarmament category was borrowed from another statutory scheme animated by different concerns.
Second, the brief argues that Washington’s law fails Wolford’s historical-inference test. Laws against carrying while intoxicated regulated conduct at the time and place of danger. Washington’s law reaches a sober person, in the home, for years.
Third, the brief argues that the Washington Supreme Court could not build a valid historical tradition by combining analogues that it acknowledged might each be insufficient standing alone.
Fourth, the brief argues that Heller’s reference to “longstanding prohibitions” on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill does not resolve this case because Washington’s law is recent, misdemeanor-based, and not directed at felons.
Why the Borrowed Definition Matters
One of the brief’s most important points is that Washington did not create a firearm-specific definition of the people it wanted to disarm.
Instead, the law incorporates the definition of “prior offense” from Washington’s DUI sentencing statute.
That definition is broad. It can include not only DUI convictions, but also certain reduced or related offenses, out-of-state equivalents, and some deferred dispositions. In some situations, the connection to alcohol or drug impairment may depend on how a charge was originally filed rather than what was ultimately proven as an element of conviction.
The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that this matters under Hemani.
A legislature cannot avoid Second Amendment scrutiny by borrowing a broad sentencing definition and treating everyone swept into that definition as categorically disarmable. Courts still must ask whether the historical tradition supports disarming the actual category of people the modern law reaches.
Why the Home Matters
The brief also emphasizes where Washington’s law operates.
Historical laws involving alcohol and firearms often focused on carrying or using firearms while intoxicated.
Those laws addressed the immediate danger created by combining intoxication and firearms.
Washington’s law operates differently. It reaches firearm possession when the person is sober. It reaches firearm possession in the home. It reaches every firearm. And violating the prohibition is itself a felony, which can create additional firearm disabilities.
That matters because Heller identified the home as the place where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.
The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that a law regulating intoxicated public carry is not the same as a law forbidding sober possession in the home for years based on past driving offenses.
Why Duration Matters
The Washington Supreme Court called the restriction temporary because a person may seek restoration after a period of years.
The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that the practical burden is still substantial.
The disability has no fixed automatic end date. It does not necessarily end when the sentence ends. It requires a later restoration process. And it can last longer than the maximum confinement authorized for the predicate misdemeanor or gross-misdemeanor offenses.
That matters under Rahimi, where the Court emphasized that the restriction was temporary and tied to the protective order context.
The brief argues that Washington’s law is not simply a lesser burden than the predicate punishment. It may outlast the predicate sentence and operate independently of any sentencing judge’s individualized determination.
Why the Predicate Proceedings Matter
The brief also focuses on process.
A DUI or DUI-related proceeding determines whether a person committed a driving offense. It does not necessarily determine anything about firearm misuse, firearm violence, threats, or whether the person is likely to misuse firearms.
That distinction matters because Rahimi involved a judicial finding of a credible threat to physical safety, and Hemani emphasized the importance of meaningful pre-deprivation process before a person loses liberty or constitutional rights.
The Biazzo–Huang brief does not argue that a conviction is irrelevant. It argues that the conviction must be connected to the historical justification for the specific firearm deprivation.
Why the “Combination of Analogues” Is Contested
The Washington Supreme Court relied on three historical traditions together: dangerousness-based disarmament, serious-crime disarmament, and alcohol/firearm regulation.
The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that a court cannot build a constitutional tradition by taking the purpose from one historical tradition and the operational burden from another.
Under Bruen and Wolford, the question is whether the analogue or collection of analogues is relevantly similar in both “how” and “why.”
The brief argues that the intoxication laws had a similar purpose but operated much more narrowly. Serious-crime traditions involved more severe offenses, not misdemeanor driving offenses. And some historic categorical-disarmament laws were tied to discriminatory practices that would not be constitutional today.
The brief’s point is not that the government can never rely on a group of analogues. It can. But the analogues must work together in a historically legitimate and legally comparable way.
What the Brief Does Not Argue
The Biazzo–Huang brief does not argue that drunk driving is safe. It is not.
It does not argue that States cannot regulate driving under the influence. They can.
It does not argue that States cannot regulate carrying firearms while intoxicated. They can, if the regulation fits the constitutional framework.
It does not argue that every conviction-based firearm restriction is unconstitutional.
It does not ask the Supreme Court to decide whether all felony-disarmament laws are valid or invalid.
The brief asks the Court to resolve a narrower question: when a State disarms people based on prior convictions, must the historical analogy account for what those convictions actually establish and how the modern firearm prohibition actually operates?
Why This Case Is Significant
This case is significant because it sits at the intersection of several unresolved Second Amendment questions.
It asks how courts should evaluate conviction-based disarmament after Bruen, Rahimi, Hemani, and Wolford.
It asks whether misdemeanor DUI-related offenses can support a broad firearm prohibition.
It asks whether a State may rely on legislative findings about future risk without showing a historical analogue that burdens the right in a comparable way.
It asks whether a law that reaches sober possession in the home can be justified by historical laws that regulated intoxicated carrying or use.
It also asks whether courts may sustain a Second Amendment restriction by combining partial analogies from different traditions.
Those questions matter beyond Washington.
The petition identifies several other jurisdictions with DUI-related firearm consequences, and lower courts have continued to divide over how to evaluate conviction-based firearm restrictions.
Why This Fits the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program
This case fits the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program because it involves constitutional limits on government power, individual rights, federalism, state criminal-law consequences, and judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
Government oversight is not partisan. It is institutional.
The same rule-of-law principle applies regardless of the constitutional right involved:
When government burdens a constitutional right, courts must apply the correct constitutional framework.
Here, the Biazzo–Huang brief argues that the Washington Supreme Court did not apply the correct framework. It treated a legislative category as enough, combined incomplete analogues, and did not adequately measure how Washington’s law burdens the right to keep arms for lawful self-defense.
Why Biazzo Law Filed
Biazzo Law’s Supreme Court and constitutional practice includes amicus curiae briefing in cases involving separation of powers, individual rights, agency limits, emergency litigation, and constitutional structure.
This brief continues that work.
The issue is not partisan politics. The issue is whether courts will apply constitutional protections with the same seriousness across contexts.
The Second Amendment should not be treated as a second-class right. Nor should courts ignore public-safety concerns. The constitutional task is to test modern regulations against the legal framework the Supreme Court has prescribed.
Key Takeaway
Holloway v. Brown asks whether Washington may impose a broad firearm-possession ban after repeat DUI-related misdemeanor convictions.
The Biazzo–Huang amici brief argues that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision conflicts with Hemani and Wolford because Washington’s law borrows a broad DUI sentencing definition, reaches sober firearm possession in the home, lasts beyond the predicate punishment, and was upheld through a combination of historical analogues that do not match the law’s operation.
The brief asks the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse.
The broader legal issue is simple:
A State may regulate firearms within constitutional limits, but when it burdens the Second Amendment, it must justify the burden through a historically comparable tradition—not merely legislative prediction, broad categorical labels, or partial analogies.
Frequently Asked Questions
What case did Biazzo Law file in?
Biazzo Law filed a Supreme Court brief of amici curiae with Huang Tiange in Jackson W. Holloway v. Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General of Washington, No. 26-300.
What is the case about?
The case concerns whether Washington may prohibit firearm possession after repeat DUI-related misdemeanor convictions within seven years.
What Second Amendment issue is presented?
The main issue is whether Washington’s conviction-based firearm prohibition is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation under Bruen.
What did the Washington Supreme Court hold?
The Washington Supreme Court held that Washington’s prohibition is constitutional without an individualized assessment of Holloway’s dangerousness and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the State.
What did the dissent say?
The dissent argued that Washington had not identified a sufficiently analogous historical tradition and that the law restricts the Second Amendment rights of people who were not convicted of violent conduct or firearm misuse.
What does the Biazzo–Huang brief argue?
The brief argues that Washington’s law cannot be reconciled with Hemani and Wolford, that it borrows a broad DUI sentencing definition, that it reaches sober possession in the home, and that the historical analogues relied on by the Washington Supreme Court do not justify the law’s burden.
Does the brief argue that drunk driving is not dangerous?
No. The brief does not minimize DUI. It argues that the constitutional question is whether a broad firearm prohibition is historically justified under the Second Amendment.
Does the brief challenge all firearm regulations?
No. The brief is limited to this case and this type of conviction-based disarmament. It does not argue that every firearm regulation is unconstitutional.
Does the brief challenge all felony-disarmament laws?
No. The brief expressly explains that the Court can resolve the case narrowly without deciding every issue involving felony-disarmament laws or all conviction-based prohibitions.
Why does Heller matter?
Heller recognized the individual right to keep and bear arms, especially for lawful self-defense in the home. The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that Washington’s law burdens that core home-possession right.
Why does Bruen matter?
Bruen requires the government to justify firearm regulations by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, rather than modern interest balancing.
Why do Rahimi, Hemani, and Wolford matter?
Those cases explain how courts should compare modern firearm laws to historical analogues. The Biazzo–Huang brief argues that the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis conflicts with those decisions.
Is this blog political?
No. This is legal analysis of a pending constitutional case. Biazzo Law’s position is nonpartisan and focuses on constitutional text, precedent, history, judicial review, and the rule of law.
Where can I read the Biazzo–Huang brief?
The filed Supreme Court brief is available here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/26/26-300/425744/20260927214944153_Biazzo%20Huang%20Brief.pdf
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