Aceituno v. DHS: Did the Supreme Court’s “Kavanaugh Stop” Ruling Give Immigration Agents Cover to Racially Profile Latino and Spanish-Speaking People?

By Biazzo Law, PLLC

July 23, 2026

A civil-rights and government oversight case in the Western District of North Carolina raises a serious question for every American:

Can federal immigration agents stop and arrest people because they look Latino, speak Spanish, work in construction or landscaping, or happen to be in places where immigrant workers may gather?

The lawsuit, Aceituno v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, was filed by five named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Four of the named Plaintiffs are alleged to be U.S. citizens. One is alleged to have a valid work permit and U-Visa.

The complaint alleges that DHS, ICE, CBP, and Border Patrol agents engaged in dragnet-style enforcement in North Carolina, including Charlotte, Durham, Raleigh, Cary, Salisbury, and other communities.

The allegations are disturbing.

According to the complaint, masked and armed federal agents stopped, detained, and arrested people without warrants, without probable cause that they were removable, and without probable cause that they were likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained.

The case also raises a broader national concern: whether the Supreme Court’s emergency-docket ruling in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo — sometimes described by commentators as a “Kavanaugh stop” ruling because of Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence — may have unintentionally or intentionally given immigration enforcement agents practical cover to stop Latino-looking people, Spanish-speaking people, and people working certain jobs without individualized suspicion.

That concern should not be treated as partisan.

It is a constitutional issue.

Immigration enforcement is lawful and important when conducted within legal limits. But appearance, language, job type, and neighborhood cannot become substitutes for individualized suspicion, probable cause, and due process.

Current Procedural Posture: The Motion to Dismiss Is Pending

This case is no longer just a newly filed complaint.

It has now been pending for several months.

The complaint was filed on February 24, 2026 in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The case is assigned to United States District Judge Susan C. Rodriguez and referred to United States Magistrate Judge W. Carleton Metcalf.

The Government filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum on June 8, 2026.

Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition on July 1, 2026.

Defendants filed their Reply on July 17, 2026.

That means the motion to dismiss appears fully briefed and pending.

The Court has not yet decided whether the case will proceed. That makes the current stage important. The Government is asking the Court to dismiss the lawsuit before discovery. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to allow the case to proceed so they can challenge what they describe as an ongoing policy or practice of unlawful warrantless immigration arrests.

There has also been an official-capacity party update. Markwayne Mullin is now the Secretary of Homeland Security and has been substituted for Kristi Noem in her official-capacity role under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Older filings and docket entries may still refer to Kristi Noem because she was the named DHS Secretary when the lawsuit was filed. But because this is an official-capacity suit, the case follows the officeholder.

The substitution does not change the core legal issue.

The case remains about whether federal immigration agents may stop, detain, and arrest people based on broad enforcement priorities, Latino appearance, Spanish language, occupation, neighborhood, or generalized suspicion — rather than individualized legal grounds.

Quick Answer: Why Does Aceituno v. DHS Matter?

Aceituno v. DHS matters because it alleges that federal immigration agents in North Carolina are using race, ethnicity, Spanish language, job type, and location as practical enforcement triggers — leading to warrantless stops and arrests of U.S. citizens and lawfully present people.

The case raises several civil-liberties concerns:

the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures;

the statutory limits on warrantless immigration arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2);

the difference between brief questioning, detention, and arrest;

the danger of using Latino appearance or Spanish language as suspicion;

the risk that emergency Supreme Court rulings may be read too broadly by enforcement agencies;

the chilling effect on schools, churches, businesses, workers, and families;

the need for government oversight when federal agents operate with masks, weapons, unmarked vehicles, and unclear identification.

The central concern is simple:

The Constitution does not require Latino U.S. citizens or Spanish-speaking lawful residents to carry passports to prove they belong in their own communities.

What Is Aceituno v. DHS?

Aceituno v. DHS is a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.

The named Plaintiffs are:

Willy Wender Aceituno;

Yoshi Cuenca Villamar;

Ruben Arguera Lopez;

Edwin Godinez;

Yair Alexander Napoles.

The defendants include federal immigration and border-enforcement agencies and officials, including DHS, CBP, Border Patrol, ICE, and relevant official-capacity agency leaders.

As noted above, Markwayne Mullin has been substituted for Kristi Noem as Secretary of Homeland Security under Rule 25(d).

The Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief.

The case is not about whether the federal government may enforce immigration law. It may.

The case is about whether immigration enforcement agents may stop and arrest people without individualized legal grounds.

What Does the Complaint Allege?

The complaint alleges that armed, masked DHS agents have roamed North Carolina communities, confronting people as they walk down the street, go to work, run errands, pick up food, and live their daily lives.

It alleges that federal agents have detained and arrested people without probable cause that they are removable and without evaluating whether they pose an escape risk.

It also alleges that agents have demanded proof of U.S. citizenship from people who appear Latino or speak Spanish, even though declining to produce citizenship documents on demand is not itself reasonable suspicion or probable cause of unlawful presence.

The complaint alleges that arrests have sometimes been violent and destructive, including smashed windows, people dragged from vehicles, phones and keys confiscated, vehicles blocked or forced off the road, people pushed to the ground, and handcuffed people transported away from the arrest site before being released.

Those allegations should concern anyone who believes in constitutional limits on government power.

Operation Charlotte’s Web and North Carolina’s Latino Communities

The complaint describes a major DHS presence in North Carolina, including Operation Charlotte’s Web.

It alleges that in November 2025, DHS sent hundreds of CBP agents into North Carolina and that the operation focused largely on Charlotte while also spreading to other urban areas, including the Research Triangle.

The complaint further alleges that these operations caused widespread community fear.

It states that over 30,000 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools students — approximately 20% of the district — were absent on November 17, 2025, while CBP agents were conducting Operation Charlotte’s Web. Durham Public Schools reportedly experienced a 68% increase in absences that week and an absence rate of almost 30% the following week. The complaint also describes increased absences in Wake, Chapel Hill-Carrboro, Catawba, and Burke County schools.

The complaint alleges that some Latino children returned to school with notes pinned to their backpacks reading:

“I am a citizen.”

That image captures the civil-liberties problem.

Children should not feel that they must wear citizenship papers to school.

Families should not fear that ordinary life — school, church, work, groceries, medical care — could trigger federal detention based on appearance, language, or location.

The Named Plaintiffs: U.S. Citizens and a Lawfully Present U-Visa Holder

The named Plaintiffs’ alleged experiences are central to the case.

Willy Wender Aceituno

Willy Wender Aceituno is a Latino man originally from Honduras who became a U.S. citizen and has lived in Charlotte for more than 25 years.

According to the complaint, CBP agents stopped him twice on the same day.

In the first encounter, agents scanned his license and confirmed that he was a U.S. citizen.

In the second encounter, a different group of agents blocked his truck, demanded that he open the door, smashed his window with a baton, dragged him out, forced him to the ground, handcuffed him, and transported him away despite his repeated statements that he was a citizen and that his identification was in his wallet.

The complaint alleges that after agents finally checked his wallet and confirmed he was a U.S. citizen with no criminal record, they dropped him off away from his truck.

Yoshi Cuenca Villamar

Yoshi Cuenca Villamar is a U.S. citizen born in Charlotte. He owns a lawn-care business.

According to the complaint, CBP agents grabbed him from behind while he was performing yard work outside a private residence. The agents allegedly pushed him to the ground and attempted to handcuff him before asking basic questions.

His brothers, also U.S. citizens, reportedly told agents they were from here and asked what the agents were doing. The complaint alleges agents did not ask for identification before placing him in a vehicle and driving away.

After agents later reviewed his license and confirmed his citizenship, they allegedly dropped him off on the side of the road and threw his wallet at him.

Ruben Arguera Lopez

Ruben Arguera Lopez is a Latino man from El Salvador who has lived in Charlotte for approximately 15 years and has a valid work permit and U-Visa.

A U-Visa is a humanitarian visa for people who assist law enforcement in investigating serious crimes.

According to the complaint, agents boxed in his vehicle while he was driving to work, questioned him, handcuffed him, and continued the detention despite his statements that he had legal status.

The complaint alleges that agents did not explain why he was being arrested, did not identify themselves, and did not present a warrant.

Edwin Godinez and Yair Alexander Napoles

Edwin Godinez and Yair Alexander Napoles are brothers. Both are Latino. Both are U.S. citizens. Godinez was born in California. Napoles was born in North Carolina.

According to the complaint, ICE agents stopped them in an unmarked vehicle after they pulled over at a red light in Salisbury. The agents allegedly asked for identification, and both men said they were U.S. citizens.

The complaint alleges that after Napoles started speaking Spanish, agents came to his side of the car, opened the door, unbuckled his seatbelt, and tried to yank him out. Agents allegedly attempted to stop the brothers from recording and used force during the encounter.

The complaint states that they were eventually allowed to leave.

These allegations are not proof. DHS and the defendants have responded by moving to dismiss and contesting the legal basis for the case.

But the allegations, if true, show why immigration enforcement based on appearance, language, and job type is dangerous.

The Pending Motion to Dismiss: What Is the Government Arguing?

The Government’s pending Motion to Dismiss is primarily jurisdictional.

It asks the Court to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1), meaning the Government argues the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

The Government’s main arguments include:

Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because past injuries do not establish a sufficiently imminent future injury;

Plaintiffs’ fear of future enforcement, changed routines, and emotional distress are not enough to support prospective injunctive relief;

Plaintiffs have not identified a reviewable final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act;

8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) limits or bars the type of classwide injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek.

In practical terms, the Government is trying to stop the case before discovery.

That is important because many of the most important facts may be in government records, including training materials, field directives, arrest reports, internal communications, operational guidance, body-camera policies, vehicle-camera footage, agent notes, and data showing who was stopped, detained, arrested, released, or removed.

Plaintiffs’ Standing Argument: Why They Say the Case Should Proceed

Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because this is not merely a case about isolated past harm.

They allege an ongoing policy or practice.

They allege continuing enforcement activity in North Carolina.

They allege that the named Plaintiffs remain within the communities and groups targeted by the challenged practice.

They allege continuing fear, changed behavior, disruption to work and daily life, and risk of future unlawful detention or arrest.

Plaintiffs also argue that the case involves not just brief questioning, but warrantless arrests. That distinction matters because 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) imposes specific requirements before an immigration officer may make a warrantless arrest.

Plaintiffs’ position is essentially this:

If the Government is continuing to use an allegedly unlawful warrantless-arrest policy, and if Plaintiffs live and work in the communities where that policy is being applied, then Plaintiffs should not have to wait to be arrested again before a federal court may consider whether the policy is unlawful.

Why the Standing Fight Matters

The standing issue matters beyond this case.

If the Court accepts the Government’s standing argument too broadly, U.S. citizens and lawfully present people allegedly swept up in immigration operations may face a serious accountability problem.

They may be told:

You were wrongfully stopped or arrested in the past, but you cannot seek an injunction because you cannot prove exactly when it will happen again.

That would make it difficult to challenge systemic enforcement practices before more people are harmed.

On the other hand, courts must also follow Article III limits. Federal courts cannot issue broad advisory opinions or supervise federal agencies unless plaintiffs show a concrete, particularized, and sufficiently imminent injury.

That is why the standing issue is the threshold fight.

The Court is not yet deciding whether DHS actually violated the law. It is deciding whether Plaintiffs have alleged enough to let the case proceed.

The Legal Problem: Stops Are Not Arrests

One of the most important legal distinctions in this case is the difference between a brief stop and a warrantless arrest.

The Government may argue that immigration officers can briefly question a person based on reasonable suspicion.

But a warrantless immigration arrest is different.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), an immigration officer may make a warrantless civil immigration arrest only when the officer has reason to believe both:

the person is in the United States in violation of immigration law; and

the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.

The complaint argues that “reason to believe” means probable cause.

That matters because the complaint alleges that DHS agents were not merely asking brief questions. It alleges agents were handcuffing people, transporting them, holding them, and releasing them only after later confirming citizenship or lawful status.

A brief stop requires one kind of justification.

A warrantless arrest requires more.

The complaint argues that DHS is collapsing those standards by treating “reasonable suspicion” as enough to arrest, when the immigration statute requires probable cause of removability and probable cause of escape risk.

The “Kavanaugh Stop” Ruling: What the Supreme Court Did

The attached Supreme Court emergency-docket ruling is Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo.

In that case, the Supreme Court stayed a district court injunction from the Central District of California. The district court had restricted immigration officers from making detentive stops based on four factors, alone or in combination:

apparent race or ethnicity;

speaking Spanish or English with an accent;

presence at certain locations, such as bus stops, car washes, day-labor pickup sites, agricultural sites, and similar places;

the type of work a person does.

Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the stay.

His concurrence stated that immigration officers may briefly detain someone for questioning if they have reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person is illegally present.

He wrote that the totality of circumstances can include the high number of undocumented people in a region, presence at day-labor locations, work in industries such as construction, landscaping, agriculture, and car washes, and lack of English fluency.

Justice Kavanaugh also stated that apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion.

That limitation is important.

But it may not be enough in practice.

How the Ruling May Have Created Practical Cover for Racial Profiling

The constitutional concern is not only what the Supreme Court technically held.

The concern is how federal agents may use the ruling on the ground.

A legal opinion can say that apparent ethnicity alone is not enough.

But if agents are told they may consider apparent ethnicity together with Spanish language, location, and job type, the real-world effect may be that Latino appearance plus Spanish language plus ordinary work becomes enough to stop someone.

That is the danger.

For many Latino U.S. citizens and lawful residents, those factors are not suspicious at all.

They describe ordinary life.

They describe identity.

They describe language.

They describe lawful work.

They describe neighborhoods.

They describe families.

They describe communities.

When those factors become law-enforcement triggers, the line between immigration enforcement and racial profiling becomes dangerously thin.

The Risk of Turning Demographics Into Suspicion

The core civil-liberties problem is demographic suspicion.

The Government may point to statistics about undocumented people in certain regions, industries, or communities.

But aggregate statistics cannot replace individualized suspicion.

A person is not suspicious because other people in a demographic category may be undocumented.

A person is not suspicious because they speak Spanish.

A person is not suspicious because they work in landscaping, construction, food service, agriculture, or car washing.

A person is not suspicious because they look Latino.

A person is not suspicious because they are standing outside a workplace, shopping center, restaurant, bus stop, or construction site.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals.

It does not permit the Government to seize people based on broad group profiles that sweep in large numbers of innocent citizens and lawful residents.

Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent Captured the Civil-Liberties Concern

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented from the Supreme Court’s stay.

Her dissent warned that the Government’s position effectively allowed agents to seize people who look Latino, speak Spanish, and appear to work low-wage jobs.

That warning is directly relevant to the North Carolina allegations.

Aceituno v. DHS alleges that agents in North Carolina have stopped and arrested Latino-appearing people and Spanish-speaking people, including U.S. citizens and a lawfully present U-Visa holder.

The dissent’s concern was not abstract.

The North Carolina complaint alleges the same kind of pattern: masked agents, unmarked vehicles, forceful encounters, people detained before status is checked, and U.S. citizens left frightened to live ordinary lives.

Why “They Can Go Free After Proving Citizenship” Is Not Enough

One of the most troubling aspects of the Supreme Court concurrence is the suggestion that if a person is a U.S. citizen or lawfully present, the person will be free to go after a brief encounter.

That may sound reassuring.

But the Aceituno complaint alleges a different reality.

It alleges that U.S. citizens were not simply stopped for a few polite questions.

It alleges they were blocked, grabbed, handcuffed, thrown to the ground, driven away, injured, threatened, separated from their vehicles, and released only after agents later confirmed what the plaintiffs had already said.

Even if an encounter eventually ends, the seizure has already occurred.

The fear has already occurred.

The force has already occurred.

The humiliation has already occurred.

The lost work, school absence, trauma, medical care, and community fear have already occurred.

A constitutional violation is not cured simply because the Government eventually realizes it detained the wrong person.

Why the Emergency Docket Matters

The Supreme Court’s ruling was an emergency-docket stay.

That means it was not a full merits decision after complete briefing, oral argument, and a final record.

Emergency rulings can have real-world consequences even when they are technically temporary.

Immigration agents, agency lawyers, supervisors, and political officials may treat an emergency stay as operational permission.

That is the danger.

A limited emergency ruling can become a field manual.

A statement about “totality of circumstances” can become a shortcut.

A note that ethnicity may be a “relevant factor” can become a practical green light for agents to rely on appearance, language, and work.

That is why government oversight is necessary.

The question is not only what the Supreme Court intended.

The question is how DHS, ICE, CBP, and Border Patrol are using the ruling in training, operations, internal guidance, public statements, and arrest decisions.

The North Carolina Complaint Suggests That This Risk Is Already Real

The Aceituno complaint alleges that agents routinely arrested people who appeared Latino or were speaking Spanish without knowing who they were or whether they were U.S. citizens or lawfully present noncitizens.

It alleges that DHS flooded areas with high concentrations of Latino residents and detained people they happened to find.

It alleges that the approach led to wrongful arrests of U.S. citizens and lawfully present individuals.

It alleges that DHS has publicly described “reasonable suspicion” as the standard for arrests, even though 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) requires probable cause of removability and probable cause of escape risk for warrantless arrests.

Those allegations, if proven, would show that the concern is not theoretical.

The concern is that emergency-docket language may be operating as practical cover for dragnet enforcement.

Civil Liberties at Stake

This case raises several civil-liberties issues.

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

A stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

An arrest requires probable cause.

Force must be reasonable.

The Government may not substitute racial appearance, language, job type, or generalized location for individualized suspicion.

Due Process

The Fifth Amendment protects persons from arbitrary federal action.

That includes U.S. citizens, lawful residents, visa holders, and noncitizens physically present in the United States.

When federal agents detain people first and verify status later, due process concerns arise.

Equal Protection Principles

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also includes equal-protection principles applicable to the federal government.

A federal enforcement practice that targets people because they appear Latino, speak Spanish, or work in jobs associated with immigrant communities raises serious equal-protection concerns.

Freedom of Movement and Daily Life

Civil liberties are not limited to courtroom rights.

People must be able to go to work, school, church, medical appointments, grocery stores, restaurants, and public streets without fearing that their appearance or language will trigger federal detention.

Recording Government Agents

The complaint includes allegations that agents tried to stop individuals from recording. The right to record government officials performing public duties is an important accountability tool, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner limits.

When agents use masks, unmarked vehicles, and force, public recording becomes even more important.

Why This Is Not an Anti-Enforcement Position

This article is not anti-immigration enforcement.

The federal government may enforce immigration law.

The Government may prioritize enforcement.

The Government may arrest people who are removable when it has lawful authority.

The Government may detain people under valid statutes and procedures.

The Government may protect officer safety.

But immigration enforcement must remain constitutional.

It must be individualized.

It must be lawful.

It must distinguish citizens, lawful residents, visa holders, and removable noncitizens.

It must follow statutory arrest limits.

It must not use appearance, language, job type, or neighborhood as proxies for unlawful presence.

That is a rule-of-law position.

What Government Oversight Should Ask Next

This case raises urgent oversight questions:

Did DHS, ICE, CBP, or Border Patrol issue training guidance after the Supreme Court’s emergency stay?

Did field agents interpret Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo as allowing stops based on Latino appearance, Spanish language, job type, and location?

Did DHS instruct agents that apparent ethnicity alone is insufficient?

Did DHS instruct agents that warrantless arrests require probable cause of removability and probable cause of escape risk?

Did agents document individualized reasonable suspicion before stops?

Did agents document probable cause before arrests?

Did agents document escape-risk findings before warrantless arrests?

Did agents record body-camera footage?

Were agents masked and unidentified?

Were vehicles marked or unmarked?

How many U.S. citizens were stopped or arrested?

How many lawful residents or visa holders were stopped or arrested?

How many people were released after status checks?

How many people were injured?

How many phones were confiscated?

How many windows were broken?

How many children missed school because of enforcement activity?

How many businesses closed because of fear of raids?

Those questions are not partisan.

They are constitutional oversight questions.

Why This Fits Biazzo Law’s Government Oversight Program

Biazzo Law’s Government Oversight Program is nonpartisan.

Learn more here:https://www.biazzolaw.com/biazzolawgovernmentoversight

The program focuses on constitutional accountability, public transparency, FOIA, civil rights, due process, Fourth Amendment protections, law-enforcement practices, immigration enforcement, public records, and appellate-aware legal analysis of government power.

This case fits that mission because it asks whether federal agents are using government power lawfully.

Government oversight is not anti-government.

It is pro-Constitution.

A constitutional republic should be able to enforce immigration law without turning Latino appearance, Spanish language, or lawful work into suspicion.

How This Relates to Biazzo Law’s Broader Oversight Work

Biazzo Law has tracked multiple recent issues involving immigration enforcement, federal law-enforcement power, prosecutorial discretion, and court oversight.

This case belongs in that broader conversation.

The same principles apply across contexts:

Government agents must follow the Constitution.

Federal power must be subject to judicial review.

Public records matter.

Agency training matters.

Courts should not permit broad demographic suspicion to replace individualized evidence.

The public should not have to guess what standards federal agents are using.

Why This Matters in Charlotte, Raleigh, Durham, Salisbury, Cary, and Across North Carolina

Aceituno v. DHS is not just a national civil-liberties case.

It is a North Carolina case.

It affects Charlotte.

It affects Durham.

It affects Raleigh.

It affects Cary.

It affects Salisbury.

It affects Chapel Hill-Carrboro, Wake County, Catawba County, Burke County, and other communities named or implicated in the complaint.

It affects students, parents, workers, church members, business owners, construction workers, landscapers, restaurant workers, U.S. citizens, visa holders, lawful residents, and immigrant families.

It affects anyone who believes people should not have to prove citizenship on demand because of how they look or what language they speak.

Why This Matters Nationwide

The Supreme Court’s emergency ruling arose from Los Angeles.

Aceituno v. DHS arises from North Carolina.

But the issue is national.

If the Government can treat ethnicity, language, work type, and location as a practical formula for suspicion, the same logic can be used anywhere:

California;

North Carolina;

Florida;

South Carolina;

Texas;

Georgia;

Illinois;

Minnesota;

Colorado;

Oregon;

Washington, D.C.;

New York;

Arizona;

Nevada;

New Mexico.

The question is not regional.

The question is whether the Fourth Amendment still requires individualized suspicion when immigration enforcement becomes politically prioritized and operationally aggressive.

What the Court Should Consider

As the case proceeds, the Court should carefully distinguish:

brief questioning from detention;

detention from arrest;

reasonable suspicion from probable cause;

probable cause of removability from probable cause of escape risk;

ethnicity as a claimed “factor” from ethnicity as a practical proxy;

lawful enforcement from dragnet enforcement;

isolated mistake from policy or practice;

temporary inconvenience from constitutional injury;

citizenship verification from unlawful seizure;

standing limitations from an accountability gap.

Those distinctions matter.

If courts blur them, civil liberties shrink.

What This Case Does Not Mean

This case should not be overstated.

The defendants have not yet been found liable.

The Government has moved to dismiss.

The complaint contains allegations, not final judicial findings.

The motion to dismiss remains pending based on the docket reviewed.

Immigration enforcement remains lawful when conducted within constitutional and statutory limits.

Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo stated that apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion and that excessive force remains governed by the Fourth Amendment.

But the civil-liberties concern remains.

A ruling can contain limiting language and still be misused in practice.

A temporary emergency stay can still shape field enforcement.

A legal standard can still become a pretext for racial profiling if agencies train, supervise, and reward agents in ways that emphasize appearance, language, and occupation rather than individualized facts.

Authority Block

Key legal authorities and concepts include:

Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure doctrine;

Fifth Amendment due process and equal-protection principles;

8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), immigration interrogation authority;

8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), warrantless immigration arrest authority;

8 C.F.R. § 287.8, immigration enforcement standards;

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1);

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d);

Administrative Procedure Act;

8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1);

Terry v. Ohio;

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce;

United States v. Arvizu;

United States v. Cortez;

Reid v. Georgia;

Brown v. Texas;

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons;

Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo;

Aceituno v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Key Takeaway

Aceituno v. DHS raises a fundamental civil-liberties concern:

Has immigration enforcement moved from individualized suspicion to demographic suspicion?

The case is now at a critical procedural stage. The lawsuit was filed in February 2026. The Government has moved to dismiss. Plaintiffs have opposed. Defendants have replied. The motion remains pending.

The Supreme Court’s emergency stay in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo did not say agents may stop people solely because they are Latino or speak Spanish. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence expressly said apparent ethnicity alone is not enough.

But the practical concern is that the ruling may have given DHS, ICE, CBP, and Border Patrol cover to combine Latino appearance, Spanish language, job type, and location into a suspicion formula that sweeps in U.S. citizens and lawful residents.

The Aceituno complaint alleges that this is already happening in North Carolina.

That should concern everyone.

Immigration enforcement must remain lawful.

The Fourth Amendment must require individualized suspicion.

Warrantless arrests must satisfy statutory limits.

U.S. citizens should not need passports to go to work.

Children should not need notes saying “I am a citizen.”

And government agents should not be permitted to turn appearance, language, and lawful work into probable cause.

That is why this case belongs within Biazzo Law’s nonpartisan Government Oversight Program.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Aceituno v. DHS?

Aceituno v. DHS is a class action filed in the Western District of North Carolina challenging alleged DHS, ICE, CBP, and Border Patrol warrantless immigration stops and arrests in North Carolina.

When was Aceituno v. DHS filed?

The complaint was filed on February 24, 2026.

What is the current procedural posture?

The Government’s Motion to Dismiss is pending. Defendants filed the motion on June 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 1, 2026, and Defendants filed their reply on July 17, 2026.

Has the Court ruled on the motion to dismiss?

Based on the docket reviewed, the Court has not yet ruled.

Who is the current Secretary of Homeland Security defendant?

Markwayne Mullin is now the Secretary of Homeland Security and has been substituted for Kristi Noem in her official-capacity role under Rule 25(d).

Why does the docket still mention Kristi Noem?

The lawsuit was filed while Kristi Noem was named in her official capacity. In official-capacity cases, a new officeholder is automatically substituted under Rule 25(d), even though older docket entries may still show the prior official’s name.

Who are the Plaintiffs?

The named Plaintiffs are Willy Wender Aceituno, Yoshi Cuenca Villamar, Ruben Arguera Lopez, Edwin Godinez, and Yair Alexander Napoles. The complaint alleges that four are U.S. citizens and one has a valid work permit and U-Visa.

What does the lawsuit allege?

The lawsuit alleges that federal agents stopped and arrested people without warrants, without probable cause of removability, and without probable cause that they were likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained.

What is Operation Charlotte’s Web?

Operation Charlotte’s Web is the DHS/CBP enforcement operation described in the complaint as sending hundreds of agents into North Carolina, especially Charlotte, while also affecting other urban areas.

What is the “Kavanaugh stop” ruling?

The phrase refers to Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, where the Supreme Court stayed a district court injunction restricting certain immigration stops in the Los Angeles area.

Did Justice Kavanaugh say agents can stop people based only on ethnicity?

No. Justice Kavanaugh expressly stated that apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion. The concern is that his broader totality-of-circumstances discussion may be used in practice to justify stops based on ethnicity plus language, job type, and location.

Why is speaking Spanish not enough for suspicion?

Millions of U.S. citizens and lawful residents speak Spanish. Language does not establish unlawful presence.

Why is working in construction or landscaping not enough?

Many U.S. citizens and lawful residents work in construction, landscaping, agriculture, restaurants, car washes, and other industries. Job type cannot replace individualized suspicion.

What is the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause?

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard used for brief investigative stops. Probable cause is a higher standard required for arrests. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), warrantless immigration arrests require probable cause of removability and probable cause of escape risk.

Why does standing matter?

Standing determines whether the Court may hear the case. Defendants argue Plaintiffs lack standing because they cannot show likely future harm. Plaintiffs argue they face ongoing risk from a continuing policy or practice and should not have to wait to be arrested again before challenging it.

Why does escape risk matter?

Congress limited warrantless immigration arrests. Under the statute, agents must have reason to believe the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. The complaint alleges DHS is not making that individualized assessment.

Does this article oppose immigration enforcement?

No. This article supports lawful immigration enforcement within constitutional and statutory limits.

How does this relate to Biazzo Law’s Government Oversight Program?

The case involves Fourth Amendment rights, due process, racial profiling concerns, federal agency conduct, immigration enforcement, public transparency, and judicial review — all core government oversight issues.