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Can Congress Stop Pay-to-Play Pardons? A Legal Guide

Corey J. Biazzo, Esq.
23 hours ago
15 min read

Can Congress Outlaw Pay-to-Play Pardons Without Touching the Pardon Power?


By Corey J. Biazzo, Esq., Biazzo Law, PLLC · Part of the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program


Quick answer


The Constitution gives the President "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment" (Art. II, § 2, cl. 1). Congress cannot take that power away, limit who may be pardoned, or undo a pardon once granted. The Supreme Court has said so for more than 150 years, and in 2024 it described the pardon power as "conclusive and preclusive," disabling Congress from acting on the subject.


But the pardon itself is not the only thing in play. Around it has grown what press reports describe as a paid market: lobbyists reportedly charging $1 million or more, success fees, large donations to political committees and presidential projects, and lucrative contracts with people close to the President.


Congress can regulate that market without touching the President's decision. It can require disclosure by pardon seekers and the people they pay, ban contingency fees for clemency advocacy, criminalize offering or accepting payment to influence clemency by anyone other than the President, protect investigations into such schemes from being shut down without notice, and use its oversight and impeachment powers. The ultimate safeguard against a President who sells a pardon is in the Constitution itself: impeachment for "Bribery."


No court, inspector general or congressional committee has found that any pardon was bought, and the White House and the recipients deny any quid pro quo. The question for Congress is not whether to prejudge those cases. It is whether the rules are strong enough for any President, of either party, in the future.


What has been reported, and what has not been proven


This is not a one-party problem


Concerns about money and pardons predate this Administration. In 2001, President Clinton pardoned financier Marc Rich, whose former wife had given large sums to Democratic causes and the Clinton library; a Republican-led House committee investigated. In 2008, President George W. Bush revoked a pardon for developer Isaac Toussie a day after granting it, when it emerged that Toussie's father had recently given to Republicans. The pattern reported today is larger, but the risk is built into a power that rests on one person's judgment.


The cases with the most reported evidence


  • David Gentile (commutation, Nov. 26, 2025). The founder of GPB Capital, convicted in a $1.6 billion fraud, was freed 12 days into a seven-year sentence. According to the New York Times and a later letter from Senators Blumenthal and Gallego, federal prosecutors in Brooklyn opened an investigation into whether payments of $2.5 million or more helped secure the commutation, including evidence of jailhouse communications. One person scrutinized was Rev. Frank Mann, a retired priest and friend of the President, who denies involvement. The investigation was reportedly closed after Associate Deputy Attorney General Aakash Singh raised concerns with the U.S. Attorney. Senators asked the Justice Department Inspector General to review the closure.

  • Julio Herrera Velutini (pardon, Jan. 15, 2026). A Venezuelan banker charged with financing a Puerto Rico governor's campaign had already secured a plea deal to a misdemeanor. According to the New York Times, a company formed by his daughter, Concord Partners, guaranteed the President's former lawyer Alina Habba more than $50 million over four years, starting January 1, while she was still serving in the Justice Department; the pardon came two weeks later. His daughter also reportedly gave $3.5 million to MAGA Inc. and $2.5 million to the White House ballroom project. The President called the contract "totally obnoxious and outrageous." Concord fired Ms. Habba on Nov. 4. She denies any role in the pardon.

  • Changpeng Zhao (pardon, Oct. 23, 2025). The Binance founder's pardon followed a $2 billion investment in Binance by an Abu Dhabi firm using a stablecoin issued by World Liberty Financial, a Trump family crypto company, and more than $1 million in lobbying. Mr. Zhao and World Liberty deny any connection to the pardon.


Donations and fees followed by clemency

Recipient

Reported money or ties

Clemency

Paul Walczak (tax crimes)

His mother reportedly gave $1 million to MAGA Inc. and attended a $1-million-per-person dinner weeks before the pardon

Pardon, April 2025; about $4.4 million in restitution erased

Trevor Milton (Nikola fraud)

Reportedly gave at least $1.84 million in 2024 to campaigns backing the President

Pardon, March 2025

Tim Leiweke (bid rigging)

His company reportedly gave $250,000 to the inauguration

Pardon, Dec. 2025

Joseph Schwartz (tax fraud)

Reportedly paid about $1.1 million to lobbying firms for "pardon advocacy"

Pardon, Nov. 2025

The market for access


  • The Wall Street Journal reported that lobbyists close to the President describe a "going rate" of $1 million, with success fees up to $6 million.

  • Lobbyists disclosed nearly $5.2 million from clemency seekers in 2025, by press accounts about eight times the prior administration's level.

  • A June 2026 Reuters investigation found that 96% of second-term clemency grants did not meet longstanding Justice Department guidelines, and that ten recipients and related companies gave more than $10 million to Trump-related groups.

  • A 60 Minutes investigation recorded lobbyists pitching a $300,000 fee to "put pressure on the president." One client who paid $600,000 received no pardon and has sought a refund.


What has not been shown


No court, inspector general or committee has found that any pardon was bought. Most reported money went to intermediaries or political committees, not to the President. The White House says it has a "robust pardon review process" and that people paying lobbyists are "foolishly wasting their money." Everyone named is presumed innocent. That uncertainty is itself the problem Congress can fix: right now, the public cannot see who paid whom, for what, before a pardon was granted.


The constitutional framework: what Congress cannot do


The text. Article II says the President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The only textual limits are that the offense must be federal and the power does not reach impeachment.


The Supreme Court has read the power broadly for 160 years:

Case

What it held

Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)

The pardon power "is unlimited," with the exception of impeachment, and "is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders" (id. at 380).

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872)

Struck down a statute that made a pardon evidence of disloyalty in claims against the government, holding that "the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law" (id. at 148).

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925)

Upheld a pardon for criminal contempt of court. Answering the concern that a President might abuse the power, the Court said such "[e]xceptional cases" would "suggest a resort to impeachment" rather than a narrow reading of the pardon power (id. at 121).

Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974)

Because the power derives from the Constitution alone, it cannot be modified, abridged or diminished by statute; the President may grant clemency "on conditions which do not in themselves offend the Constitution" (id. at 264, 266).

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)

Quoting Klein and Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence, described the President's authority to pardon as "conclusive and preclusive," "disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject," and held a former President absolutely immune from prosecution for acts within those core powers.

What this rules out. Under these cases, Congress cannot:


  • require approval by the Justice Department, a board or Congress before a pardon takes effect;

  • bar pardons for certain crimes or certain people (such as donors, family members or the President himself);

  • void a pardon after it is granted, even if it was obtained corruptly; or

  • punish the President for the decision to pardon.


Changing any of those would take a constitutional amendment. Several have been proposed over the years, and they are a legitimate long-term option, but amendments require two-thirds of each House and three-quarters of the states.


What Trump v. United States leaves unsettled. The 2024 decision raised a hard question: could a President who took money for a pardon be prosecuted for bribery? Justice Barrett's concurrence warned that excluding "any mention" of the official act "would hamstring the prosecution" of a bribe. The majority answered in footnote 3 that "the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act," and "may admit evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act," citing the bribery statute, but "may not" admit "testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself." That footnote appears in the Court's discussion of evidence about official acts generally. Scholars disagree about whether it permits prosecuting a President for a bribe tied to a pardon, an act the Court placed within the President's absolutely immune core powers. A White House lawyer at a 2026 confirmation hearing reportedly called a $1 million pardon bribe a "complicated legal question." That uncertainty is why the Constitution's own remedy matters: the President "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" (Art. II, § 4).


What Congress can do


The pardon power belongs to the President. But Congress has broad Article I powers over everyone else involved:


  • The "necessary and proper" power to make laws carrying out the government's powers, including laws defining federal crimes and protecting the integrity of federal offices.

  • The power to regulate commerce, including paid lobbying, consulting and fundraising.

  • The power of the purse and of oversight, including the power to investigate how the Justice Department handles clemency and investigations of clemency-related payments.

  • The impeachment power, which the Constitution expressly applies to bribery.


The Supreme Court has long upheld disclosure rules for those paid to influence government and for political spending. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court upheld the federal lobbying disclosure law after construing it narrowly to cover direct communication with Congress, holding that Congress may require disclosure of lobbying activities. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), it upheld federal campaign disclosure requirements, while allowing exemptions where disclosure would expose contributors to a reasonable probability of threats or harassment. In Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), eight Justices upheld disclosure and disclaimer requirements even while the Court struck down limits on independent spending. Congress also already makes it a crime to pay or accept money in exchange for help obtaining a federal appointment (18 U.S.C. § 211). The constitutional line is clear: Congress may not regulate the President's choice, but it may regulate the money, the middlemen and the record around it.


Reform options, ranked by constitutional risk

Option

Who it regulates

Constitutional risk

Why

Disclosure by clemency recipients of payments and gifts tied to their clemency

Recipients

Low

Does not affect the pardon; similar to upheld lobbying and campaign disclosure. The No Payoffs for Pardons Act (introduced Aug. 3, 2026) takes this approach.

Registration and disclosure by paid "clemency advocates"

Lobbyists, lawyers, consultants

Low

Modeled on the Lobbying Disclosure Act and FARA. Incoming House Judiciary leaders have floated a "pardon agent" registry.

Ban on contingency or success fees for clemency advocacy

Intermediaries

Low to moderate

Federal contracting law has long barred contingent fees; must preserve the right to petition and normal legal fees.

Crime of paying or accepting money to obtain clemency through influence

Payers and intermediaries

Low to moderate

Modeled on 18 U.S.C. § 211 (buying appointments). Targets private conduct, not the President's act.

Notice to Congress when an investigation of clemency-related payments is closed by political appointees

Justice Department

Low

A reporting rule; does not dictate charging decisions.

Disclosure of donations by clemency seekers to the President's committees, library, inaugural fund or projects

Donors and recipient organizations

Low to moderate

Disclosure is broadly upheld; outright donation bans would face serious First Amendment challenge.

Statute making clear that § 201 bribery applies to the President

President

Moderate to high

Courts may hold prosecution barred under Trump v. United States; best paired with impeachment and disclosure.

Requiring approval of pardons, voiding corrupt pardons, or banning categories of pardons

President

Unconstitutional without an amendment

Garland, Klein, Schick

A note on fairness. Asking for clemency is protected by the First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Anyone, including a person in prison, a family member, or an advocacy group, must remain free to ask for mercy and to hire a lawyer to help. The reforms above target hidden payments and success-based fees, not the right to ask.


Model legislation


What our model bills already include


Our Restoring Checks and Balances Act of 2027 already contains Section 605, Clemency Advocacy Disclosure and Anti-Bribery, which:

  • treats paid communications seeking clemency as "lobbying contacts" under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, with no minimum dollar threshold;

  • creates a new crime, 18 U.S.C. § 227a, for corruptly giving or receiving anything of value "in exchange for influencing or obtaining a pardon, commutation, or reprieve," while protecting reasonable legal fees and disclosed lobbying;

  • requires the Attorney General to publish, within 30 days of each grant, the recipient, the offense and the people known to have advocated for it; and

  • states that nothing in it "limits the power of the President" to pardon "or affects the validity of any grant of clemency."


The bill's other ethics provisions, including a ban on individual stock trading by senior officials and disclosure of payments from foreign and domestic governments, apply to the President only from January 20, 2029, so no one can claim they target a sitting officeholder.


The No Payoffs for Pardons Act, introduced August 3, 2026 by Senators Schumer and Blumenthal and Rep. Morelle, takes a complementary approach: it would require clemency recipients to disclose significant financial gifts made in connection with their clemency, at the time of the grant and for four years afterward, and would clarify that federal bribery laws apply to the President and Vice President.


New model text: the Clemency Integrity Act of 2027


The following provisions fill the remaining gaps.

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Clemency Integrity Act of 2027."SEC. 2. NO SUCCESS FEES. No person may give, offer, demand or receive any payment contingent in whole or in part on whether a pardon, commutation, reprieve or remission is granted. A violation is punishable by a civil penalty of up to three times the fee, and a knowing violation by a fine and imprisonment of not more than 5 years. This section does not apply to an hourly or fixed fee for legal services that is not contingent on the outcome.SEC. 3. RECIPIENT DISCLOSURE. Not later than 60 days after receiving clemency, a recipient shall file with the Attorney General, for public release, a statement identifying (1) each person paid to seek clemency on the recipient's behalf and the amount paid; and (2) any contribution or gift of $10,000 or more, made by the recipient or by an immediate family member or entity they control within the two years before the grant, to the President, the Vice President, any authorized campaign committee, inaugural committee, presidential library foundation, legal defense fund, or any organization or project the President controls or has publicly solicited funds for. The statement shall be updated annually for four years.SEC. 4. NOTICE OF CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS. Within 30 days after the Department of Justice closes or declines any investigation of payments made to obtain or influence clemency, if the decision was made or directed by an official appointed by the President, the Attorney General shall notify the Chair and Ranking Member of the Committees on the Judiciary of the date, the official involved and the reason, in a form that protects grand jury material.SEC. 5. RECORDS. The Office of the Pardon Attorney shall keep a record of every clemency request it receives or learns of, including requests sent directly to the White House, and the identity of each person who advocated for it. These records shall be preserved and made available to the Inspector General.SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this Act requires the President to consult any person before granting clemency, limits the classes of offenses or persons who may receive clemency, or affects the validity or effect of any grant of clemency. Nothing in this Act restricts any person's right to petition the Government or to retain counsel.SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE; SEVERABILITY. This Act applies to conduct occurring on or after the date of enactment. If any provision is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected.

Why these proposals should survive a court challenge


  • They regulate private conduct, not the pardon. Every obligation falls on clemency seekers, intermediaries, donors or the Justice Department. Section 6 tracks Garland, Klein and Schick: no approval requirement, no excluded classes, no effect on validity.

  • Disclosure is well established. Courts have upheld lobbying and political disclosure laws for decades (Harriss; Buckley; Citizens United).

  • There is a close statutory model. Congress already criminalizes buying help to obtain a federal appointment (18 U.S.C. § 211), another power the Constitution gives the President.

  • Petition rights are protected. Anyone may still ask for mercy and pay a lawyer by the hour.

  • Prospective only. The Act reaches only future conduct, avoiding any ex post facto problem.

  • Severability keeps the rest of the Act in force if any part is struck.


An oversight path for the 120th Congress


The likely incoming House Judiciary chair has already said he wants to examine "pardon brokers" and has floated registering them as "pardon agents." A lawful inquiry should follow the methods in our Records Roadmap, witness outlines and subpoena playbook, and it should focus on the market around pardons, not on second-guessing the President's choices.


Committees: House and Senate Judiciary; the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which has opened a preliminary inquiry into the Gentile commutation; and House Oversight.


Step 1: State the legislative purpose


Tie the inquiry to the bills above: clemency-advocacy disclosure, success-fee bans, recipient disclosure and notice of closed investigations. That answers the legislative-purpose test of Watkins and Mazars from the start.


Step 2: Request records

Records

From

Why they matter

Records of the closure of the Eastern District of New York's Gentile inquiry, including communications with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General

Justice Department

Tests whether an investigation of clemency-related payments was shut down for improper reasons

Office of the Pardon Attorney files and logs of requests routed outside the Office

Justice Department

Shows how clemency decisions are being made and who advocated

Ethics approvals for outside employment of senior Justice Department officials, including the Concord Partners engagement

Justice Department

Tests whether conflict rules were followed

Lobbying registrations and payment records for clemency engagements

Lobbying firms (voluntary first)

Shows the scale of the paid market

Contracts, invoices and success-fee terms

Intermediaries and clemency recipients (voluntary first)

Shows whether payments were contingent on outcomes

Step 3: Hear from witnesses


  • Former pardon attorneys of both parties and independent scholars of the pardon power

  • The Pardon Attorney and the Deputy Attorney General's office, on process and on the Gentile closure

  • The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

  • Lobbyists and intermediaries who were paid for clemency work, starting with voluntary interviews

  • Clemency recipients, voluntarily, with care not to punish people for having sought mercy


Step 4: Respect privilege and secrecy


The President's own deliberations about whom to pardon may raise presidential communications privilege, and grand jury material is protected by Rule 6(e). But payments to private intermediaries, lobbying contracts and the Justice Department's handling of investigations are not privileged. See our executive privilege guide. Career employees with information may speak with Congress lawfully; see our whistleblower guide.


Step 5: Findings, legislation and, if warranted, impeachment


Issue a bipartisan report and move the reforms above. If the record ever showed that any President accepted something of value in exchange for clemency, the Constitution names the remedy: impeachment for bribery. Our model articles concerning the President and concerning the Attorney General are offered as drafting material, not conclusions. See also our Ending Corruption oversight plan.


Frequently asked questions


Can Congress stop the President from pardoning someone? No. Under Ex parte Garland and later cases, Congress cannot block, condition or undo a pardon. Only a constitutional amendment could change that.


Is it already illegal to pay for a pardon? Paying a federal official in exchange for an official act is bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201. But most reported money went to lobbyists, lawyers, friends or political committees, not to the President, and federal law does not clearly cover paying a private intermediary to influence clemency. Whether a President can be prosecuted for accepting a bribe tied to a pardon is unsettled after Trump v. United States.


Would these reforms stop people from asking for mercy? No. The right to petition the government is protected by the First Amendment. The reforms target hidden payments and success fees, not requests for clemency or ordinary legal representation.


Isn't this aimed at one President? The proposals apply to every future President of either party. Past controversies, including the 2001 Marc Rich pardon and a 2008 pardon revoked over donations, show the risk is not new.


What can I do? Ask your Representative and Senators whether they will support clemency-advocacy disclosure and a ban on pardon success fees, and share this guide.


Related materials from the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program


Members, staff and the public may use these materials freely. Questions? Contact Biazzo Law.


Sources


Constitution, statutes and cases

  • U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. II, § 4; amend. I

  • 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 211; Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

  • Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)

Legislation and congressional materials

News reporting


Disclaimer


This article is published by Biazzo Law, PLLC for educational and civic purposes. It is nonpartisan and does not endorse or oppose any candidate or party. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. It summarizes public records and news reports as of November 20, 2026. No court, inspector general or congressional committee has found that any pardon was purchased, and everyone named is presumed innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Model legislation is offered for discussion and should be reviewed by legislative counsel before introduction.

Country over Party. Patriot over Partisan.

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