Investigating the Justice Department: A 120th Congress Plan

Restoring an Independent Justice Department: A Lawful Investigative and Legislative Plan for the 120th Congress
By Corey J. Biazzo, Esq., Biazzo Law, PLLC — Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program. Country over Party. Patriot over Partisan.
In short: Since 2025, federal judges have repeatedly found that the U.S. Department of Justice used its power for improper purposes. Grand juries have also refused to indict in politically sensitive cases. Judges quashed grand-jury subpoenas to the Federal Reserve as pretextual and subpoenas to Minnesota officials as issued "to harass, coerce and retaliate." They dismissed a prosecution as vindictive, threw out charges against two former FBI officials as "weaponization," and dismissed indictments brought by prosecutors who were not lawfully in office. Several of the sharpest rulings came from judges appointed by Republican presidents. Every American, of every party, depends on a Justice Department that charges people based on evidence, not on who they are or what they said. This guide gives members of the 120th Congress a lawful plan to investigate, preserve evidence, compel testimony and documents with a valid legislative purpose, and pass laws so that no future administration of either party can turn federal law enforcement against its critics.
Key facts at a glance
Matter | What happened | Court or grand-jury result |
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell | Grand-jury subpoenas over the Fed renovation and Powell's Senate testimony | Quashed Mar. 13, 2026; Chief Judge Boasberg found "essentially zero evidence" of a crime and pretextual justifications; probe dropped Apr. 2026 |
Minnesota officials (Gov. Walz, Mayor Frey, and others) | Six grand-jury subpoenas during "Operation Metro Surge" | Quashed June 2026; Chief Judge Schiltz found them issued "to harass, coerce, and retaliate" |
Kilmar Abrego Garcia | Revived smuggling indictment after his court-ordered return | Dismissed as vindictive May 22, 2026 (Judge Crenshaw) |
Former FBI officials Floris and Benavides | Charged by complaint, days before the midterms, with lying to Congress | Dismissed Nov. 2, 2026; Magistrate Judge Faruqui called it "weaponization" |
James Comey and Letitia James | Indictments obtained by an interim U.S. attorney | Dismissed Nov. 24, 2025 because she was unlawfully appointed; two grand juries refused to re-indict James; appeal argued Sept. 15, 2026 |
Six lawmakers ("illegal orders" video) | Sought indictment | D.C. grand jury refused, Feb. 10, 2026 |
"Broadview Six" protesters (Chicago) | Indictment after an earlier no-bill | Dismissed with prejudice May 2026 after grand-jury problems came to light (Judge Perry) |
David Hearn (Reflecting Pool) | Felony indictment later conceded to be meritless | Dismissed with prejudice Oct. 1, 2026, citing risk of "political pressure brought by the President" |
Anti-Weaponization Fund | $1.776 billion settlement fund drawn on the Judgment Fund | Court found the underlying suit collusive (July 13, 2026); fund rescinded Aug. 2026 |
Press | Garland-era limits on subpoenas to journalists rescinded Apr. 2025; FBI searched a Washington Post reporter's home Jan. 14, 2026 | No court ruling on the search reported |
What happened, and what have courts found?
The record below separates three kinds of evidence. Judicial findings are the strongest. Grand-jury refusals show that the government failed to establish probable cause, but they are not findings of bad motive. Allegations are claims no court has decided. The government's positions and the cases it won appear in the next section.
Investigations of officials and institutions that displeased the President.
The Federal Reserve. In January 2026, prosecutors in the District of Columbia served grand-jury subpoenas on the Fed's Board about the headquarters renovation and Chair Powell's June 2025 Senate testimony. On March 13, 2026, Chief Judge James Boasberg quashed them. He found that "[a] mountain of evidence suggests that the Government served these subpoenas on the Board to pressure its Chair into voting for lower interest rates or resigning," and that the government had "produced essentially zero evidence to suspect Chair Powell of a crime." Republican Sen. Thom Tillis held up the nomination of Powell's successor until the probe ended. Prosecutors dropped it in April. See Federal Judge Quashes Subpoenas in Investigation of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell.
Minnesota. On January 20, 2026, during a federal immigration surge, the Justice Department served six grand-jury subpoenas on the offices of the governor, the attorney general, two mayors, and two counties. Chief Judge Patrick Schiltz, a George W. Bush appointee, quashed all six. He wrote that "[i]nitiating a criminal investigation in order to harass political opponents or to coerce them into taking official action … is a blatantly unlawful and unethical use [of] the grand-jury process."
Members of Congress. After six lawmakers who served in the military or intelligence community posted a video reminding troops to refuse unlawful orders, the Justice Department sought to indict them. A D.C. grand jury refused on February 10, 2026. On November 7, 2026, after the midterms, the President directed the Department to "look into" Democrats' "threatening letters" and named Sen. Slotkin.
Prosecutions courts rejected.
Abrego Garcia. After the government unlawfully deported Kilmar Abrego Garcia and the courts ordered his return, the Department revived a closed 2022 traffic-stop matter as a smuggling indictment. On May 22, 2026, Judge Waverly Crenshaw dismissed it as vindictive. He found that absent the successful lawsuit, "the Government would not have brought this prosecution." See Federal Court Dismisses Abrego Garcia Prosecution.
Former FBI officials. Prosecutors charged two former FBI officials by complaint, not indictment, with lying to Congress in 2023. On November 2, 2026, the day before the midterms, Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. He said: "What has transpired here cannot be described as anything other than weaponization," and "I will not bury my head in the sand and pretend that I cannot read a calendar." The Department said it disagreed and could still seek an indictment.
Comey and James. A former personal lawyer to the President was installed as interim U.S. attorney and obtained indictments of former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James. A career prosecutor who reportedly found no probable cause against James was fired, and the prior U.S. attorney resigned under pressure. On November 24, 2025, Judge Cameron Currie held the interim U.S. attorney was unlawfully appointed and dismissed both indictments. Two grand juries then refused to re-indict James. The Fourth Circuit heard the appeal on September 15, 2026. Comey now faces two other charging efforts, which are pending. See Why the James Comey Seashell Threat Case Appears Frivolous.
Protesters. In the "Broadview Six" case, prosecutors obtained an indictment after an earlier grand jury returned a rare no-bill. Judge April Perry later found problems in the grand-jury record, including improper vouching and redactions that hid them, and the charges were dismissed with prejudice. She has ordered the U.S. attorney to testify. See Federal Protest Prosecution Dismissed With Prejudice and Broadview Six Case Enters New Accountability Phase.
David Hearn. A retired Olympic canoeist was indicted for a felony after touching a loose liner in the renovated Reflecting Pool. Prosecutors later moved to dismiss, citing records of a "rushed and flawed installation." After the President criticized his own U.S. attorney for dropping it, Judge Todd Edelman dismissed with prejudice. He cited "the unique possibility that the government will revive this case … based on political pressure brought by the President of the United States upon his subordinate officers."
Unlawful appointments. Courts have found at least five interim or acting U.S. attorneys unlawfully serving or disqualified, in Virginia, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, and California. Indictments those officials brought have been dismissed as a result.
Dismissals favoring allies. In February 2025, Department leadership ordered the dismissal of the corruption case against New York Mayor Eric Adams. The acting U.S. attorney resigned rather than comply, describing what she called "an improper offer of immigration enforcement assistance in exchange for a dismissal." In 2026, the Department moved to vacate seditious-conspiracy convictions of January 6 leaders and Steve Bannon's contempt-of-Congress conviction.
Money, the press, and personnel.
The Anti-Weaponization Fund. In May 2026, the Department agreed to settle the President's own lawsuit and to create a $1.776 billion fund, drawn on the permanent Judgment Fund, to pay people a body removable by the President deemed victims of "weaponization." A federal judge found the suit collusive, and the fund was rescinded. See Can Congress Investigate the Anti-Weaponization Fund?
The press. In April 2025, the Attorney General rescinded the limits on subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants directed at journalists. In January 2026, the FBI searched a Washington Post reporter's home in a leak case. See New York Times Grand Jury Subpoenas Withdrawn.
Career staff. Prosecutors and agents who worked on cases involving the President were fired or demoted. Six Minnesota prosecutors resigned after leadership declined a civil-rights investigation of a fatal shooting by an ICE agent. Thousands of Department lawyers had left by April 2026. See Nine FBI Agents and Analysts Sue Over Firings.
Judges' loss of trust. ProPublica reported more than 40 cases in which judges questioned or withdrew the "presumption of regularity" normally given to the government's representations. That presumption is how courts save time and trust the government's word. Losing it costs every honest prosecutor and every litigant.
For related matters, see After Pam Bondi: Building the Record, Model Impeachment Articles Against AG Todd Blanche, and Why DOJ Lacked Authority for Its California Ballot Demand.
What law governs the Justice Department's use of its power?
The core rule is old and bipartisan. The prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Principle | Authority | Where it applies here |
"To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." A presumption of vindictiveness arises only where there is a "realistic likelihood" of it, typically after the defendant exercises a right; otherwise, especially before trial, the defendant must prove actual vindictiveness | Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) | Abrego Garcia; the six lawmakers |
A decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard," including the exercise of protected rights; the defendant must show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose, and even discovery requires a "demanding" showing | Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) | Journalists; critics |
Grand juries may not "select targets of investigation out of malice or an intent to harass" | United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) | Fed and Minnesota subpoenas |
Courts may not require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, but "Congress is free to prescribe it" | United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) | A gap Congress can close |
Interim U.S. attorneys serve 120 days; then the district court may appoint | 28 U.S.C. § 546; Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d | Unlawful appointments |
Grand-jury secrecy | Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) | Limits what Congress can obtain |
Department attorneys must follow state bar ethics rules | 28 U.S.C. § 530B | Bar referrals and discipline |
Fees for defendants in prosecutions that were "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith" | Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note | A remedy for targets |
Members' legislative acts are protected | Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) | Threats to prosecute members for oversight |
Newsroom searches are limited | Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa | The search of a reporter's home |
What is not law. Many of the most important safeguards are only Department policy. These include the limits on White House contacts about specific cases and the rules on subpoenas to journalists. They also include the practice of avoiding overt investigative steps near an election, and the career review of charging decisions. A new Attorney General can rescind any of them, as happened with the media rules in 2025. That is the strongest legislative case for this investigation.
The government's side, stated fairly.
In Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), the Supreme Court held that the President has "exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials." It held him "absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials," even where the requested investigations were alleged to be "sham[s]." The Court also said that "Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President's actions on subjects within his 'conclusive and preclusive' constitutional authority." Congress keeps its power to investigate the Department, fund it, and set rules for its officers. But reforms should be drafted to govern Department officials and procedures, such as logging, reporting, and career review, rather than to restrict the President's own decisions. A statute aimed directly at the President's control of investigations would face serious constitutional challenge.
Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion and a presumption of regularity.
The Department has won some contested matters. Former National Security Adviser John Bolton pleaded guilty to retaining national-defense information in a case begun before 2025. A state judge was convicted of obstruction. A court of appeals allowed most of the assault case against a member of Congress to proceed.
The Department argues that appointment defects are at most an error in title that should not void indictments. It also argues that prosecuting false statements to Congress protects Congress.
These are real arguments, and a credible investigation will hear them.
Where does Congress get the power to investigate, and what is the legislative purpose?
Congress created the Justice Department by statute in 1870, and it controls the Department's structure, budget, and rules. Congress may compel testimony and documents on any subject on which it could legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), arose from a Senate investigation of the Justice Department under Attorney General Harry Daugherty, and held that "the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
Constitutional source | Legislative question | Records and witnesses it supports |
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (necessary and proper; creating and organizing the Department) | Should Congress require Department officials to log and report White House contacts about specific cases, and route them through designated senior officials? | Contact logs; communications between the White House and the Department about named targets |
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (advice and consent) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 | Should Congress close the gaps that let unlawfully serving U.S. attorneys bring cases? | Appointment papers; legal opinions on the Vacancies Act |
Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (appropriations) | Should Congress limit the Judgment Fund and require court approval and disclosure of large settlements with the government's own officials? | Anti-Weaponization Fund records |
Art. I, § 8, cl. 9 and the Rules Enabling Act (lower courts; procedure) | Should Congress require presentation of substantial exculpatory evidence to grand juries and limit re-presentment after a no-bill? | Charging memos, declination memos (redacted as needed) |
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18; First Amendment | Should Congress enact a press shield law and codify limits on subpoenas and searches of journalists? | Approvals for subpoenas and the warrant |
Art. I, § 6 (Speech or Debate) and Congress's institutional interests | Should Congress require notice to congressional leadership before investigating members for legislative acts? | Records of the investigation of the six lawmakers |
Inspector General Act | Should the Inspector General have jurisdiction over attorney misconduct, now handled by the Office of Professional Responsibility? | OPR and IG referral records |
Drafting tips. State the legislative purpose in the committee's resolution and every cover letter. Seek policies, communications, and decision records rather than the evidence in open cases. Requests for the President's own records should also meet Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848 (2020): explain why Congress needs them, why other sources will not do, and why the request is no broader than necessary. For enforcement if the Department refuses, see Enforcing Congressional Subpoenas: A 120th Congress Playbook and Stephen Miller, Executive Privilege, and What Congress Can Do.
What does a lawful investigative plan look like?
Committees with jurisdiction.
House and Senate Judiciary: primary jurisdiction over the Department
House Oversight and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: government-wide conduct and inspectors general
Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations subcommittees: the budget
Senate Banking and House Financial Services: the Federal Reserve matters
Intelligence committees: leak cases involving classified information
Phase 1, Days 1–30: Organize and preserve. Adopt a resolution stating the legislative purpose. Send preservation letters. Request the public court records in each case. Ask the Inspector General and GAO to review the Anti-Weaponization Fund, the White House contacts policy, and the use of acting and interim U.S. attorneys.
Phase 2, Days 30–90: Voluntary requests. Request policies, contact logs, appointment records, and the communications behind each matter. Invite former career prosecutors, agents, and supervisors who resigned or were removed to give transcribed interviews. Open a secure whistleblower channel.
Phase 3, Days 60–150: Compulsory process. Subpoena records and witnesses where requests are refused, each tied to a named bill. Log privilege claims and negotiate accommodations in writing.
Phase 4, Days 90–180: Public hearings. Hold three hearings: independence (White House contacts and targeting of critics); integrity (grand juries, vindictive prosecutions, unlawful appointments); and money and the press (the Fund and media subpoenas). Hear first from former career officials and scholars of differing views, then from current leadership.
Phase 5, Day 180 on: Legislate and follow up. Mark up reforms, attach conditions to Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations, and track compliance.
For witness-and-evidence models, see our investigative plan guide.
How should Congress preserve the evidence, and what should it seek?
Send preservation letters first to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General; the FBI Director; the U.S. attorneys' offices in the District of Columbia, Eastern District of Virginia, Southern District of Florida, Minnesota, Northern District of Illinois, Northern District of New York, and Middle District of Tennessee; the Office of Legal Counsel; the Office of Professional Responsibility; the Inspector General; the White House Counsel; and the Archivist. Cover email, texts, messaging apps (including disappearing-message apps), calendars, visitor and contact logs, drafts, and personal devices used for official business. Ask for written confirmation within 14 days.
Priority documents
Record | Why it matters | Bill it informs |
White House–Justice Department contact logs and communications about named targets | Whether political officials directed specific cases | Codified contacts policy |
Case-opening and closing memos for the Fed, Minnesota, James, Comey, Schiff, and lawmaker matters | The stated basis for each investigation | Vindictive-prosecution safeguards |
Records of the removal or resignation of career prosecutors who declined to charge | Whether declining to charge cost people their jobs | Protection for career prosecutors |
Appointment papers and Vacancies Act opinions for interim U.S. attorneys | How unlawful appointments happened | Vacancies Act reform |
Weaponization Working Group charter, membership, and work product | What the group did and to whom | Reporting requirements |
Anti-Weaponization Fund settlement, valuation, and payment records | Whether permanent appropriations were misused | Judgment Fund limits |
Approvals for subpoenas, orders, and warrants involving journalists | Whether media safeguards were followed | Press shield law |
Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspector General referrals and outcomes | Whether internal checks worked | Inspector General jurisdiction |
Communications about the timing of charges before the 2026 midterms | Whether election-season practices were ignored | Election-sensitivity rules |
Witness sequence (by role, not name)
Order | Witness | Purpose |
1 | Former career prosecutors, agents, and supervisors who resigned or were removed (voluntary) | What they saw and were asked to do |
2 | Former Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General of both parties, and scholars of differing views | Norms, history, and the government's best arguments |
3 | Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility leaders | Whether internal checks worked |
4 | U.S. attorneys and supervisors in the affected districts | Decisions and instructions |
5 | Senior Department leadership and FBI leadership | Policies, reasons, and authority |
Grand-jury material. Rule 6(e) generally bars disclosure of matters before a grand jury, and Congress cannot simply subpoena it. In 2020 the D.C. Circuit held that a Senate impeachment trial is a "judicial proceeding" that permits court-ordered disclosure, but the Supreme Court vacated that decision as moot in 2021, so the question remains unsettled. Seek instead the Department's own records about its decisions, which are not grand-jury material, and the public filings in each case.
What guardrails keep the investigation fair and keep people out of trouble?
Do not interfere with pending cases. Many matters are still in court, including the Comey cases, the James appeal, the journalists' case in Minnesota, and the Broadview Six misconduct hearing. Seek records about policies and decisions, not evidence that would affect a trial. Time hearings to avoid prejudicing a jury.
Respect grand-jury secrecy and classified information. Follow Rule 6(e) and handle classified material only in approved spaces.
Protect whistleblowers. Department and FBI employees who lawfully disclose wrongdoing to Congress are protected. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(C) and, for the FBI, 5 U.S.C. § 2303. See Whistleblowers and Congress: A Guide for Federal Employees.
Respect the Fifth Amendment. Immunity (18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005) can make later prosecution very hard. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Consult before voting.
Keep members inside the rules. The Speech or Debate Clause protects legislative acts like hearings and reports, not press releases. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Members should not threaten anyone with prosecution. Congress refers; it does not charge.
Do not attack judges or jurors. Rely on their rulings; do not personalize disagreements with them. Never seek the identities of grand jurors.
Treat every party the same. Ask whether each rule would be acceptable if the other party held the Department. Include the matters the Department won.
Write general laws. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), bars legislative punishment of named people.
Watch the clock. House subpoenas expire when a Congress ends. Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
What laws should the 120th Congress pass?
# | Reform | What it would do |
1 | Codify the White House contacts policy | Require that contacts about specific investigations be routed to the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or their designees, and that Department officials log every contact and report them to the Judiciary Committees (drafted to govern Department officials, not the President, in light of Trump v. United States) |
2 | Protect career judgment | Require the Attorney General to report to Congress within 7 days when a U.S. attorney or career supervisor is removed after declining to bring charges, with reasons |
3 | Close the U.S. attorney appointment gaps | Make 28 U.S.C. § 546 the exclusive path after 120 days, bar re-labeling to evade it, and require prompt judicial review |
4 | Grand-jury integrity | Require presentation of substantial exculpatory evidence, notice to the court of any no-bill, and court approval before re-presenting the same charges without new evidence |
5 | Vindictive-prosecution remedy | Strengthen the Hyde Amendment so courts must award fees when a prosecution is found vindictive or in bad faith |
6 | Election-season safeguards | Require written approval and notice to the court for overt investigative steps against candidates within 60 days of a federal election |
7 | Members' legislative acts | Require notice to congressional leadership before investigating a member for legislative or oversight activity |
8 | Press shield law | Codify limits on subpoenas, court orders, and searches directed at journalists (the PRESS Act passed the House without opposition in 2024) |
9 | Judgment Fund limits | Bar Judgment Fund payments for unidentified future claimants and require court approval and public disclosure of large settlements involving government officials |
10 | Inspector General jurisdiction | Give the Inspector General jurisdiction over attorney misconduct, with for-cause removal protection |
11 | Transparent dismissals | Require a public statement of reasons when the Department moves to dismiss or vacate charges against public officials |
12 | Annual report | Require an annual report on politically sensitive investigations, appointments, and court findings of vindictiveness or misconduct |
For model language and veto-proof strategy, see Model Bills for the 120th Congress and Veto-Proof Reform Laws to Protect the Separation of Powers.
Let's talk
If you are a member of the 120th Congress, a committee staffer, a current or former Justice Department employee with lawful information to share, or a citizen targeted by an investigation, we welcome the conversation. Contact Biazzo Law or visit the Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program.
Companion resources
Federal Judge Quashes Subpoenas in Investigation of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell
Trump DOJ Invokes Alien Terrorist Removal Court for First Time
Biazzo Law Files Supreme Court Amicus Brief in USPS Ballot Mail Case
Biazzo Law Participates on Winning Side in Five Supreme Court Cases
ICE Agent Violence: Accountability, Congress, and State Charges
Stephen Miller, Executive Privilege, and What Congress Can Do
Model Articles of Impeachment Against Trump for the 120th Congress
Trump Impeachment Investigative Plan: Witnesses and Evidence
Open Letter to the 120th Congress: Restore Checks and Balances
Frequently asked questions
Can Congress investigate the Justice Department's handling of specific cases? Yes. Congress created the Department and controls its budget and rules, and McGrain v. Daugherty (1927) arose from an investigation of the Attorney General. Committees should focus on policies and decisions and avoid interfering with pending trials.
What is a vindictive prosecution? A prosecution brought to punish someone for exercising a legal right, such as winning a lawsuit or speaking out. In May 2026 a federal judge dismissed the Abrego Garcia case on that ground.
Can a grand-jury subpoena be quashed for an improper purpose? Yes. Grand juries may not "select targets of investigation out of malice or an intent to harass." United States v. R. Enterprises (1991). Federal judges quashed subpoenas to the Federal Reserve and to Minnesota officials on that ground in 2026.
Doesn't the President control the Justice Department? The Supreme Court held in Trump v. United States (2024) that the President has exclusive authority over the Department's investigative and prosecutorial functions. Congress still decides the Department's structure, funding, and rules for its officers, and can investigate how that authority is used, but reforms should regulate Department officials rather than the President's own decisions.
Can Congress get grand-jury records? Generally not. Rule 6(e) protects grand-jury secrecy. Congress can seek the Department's own decision records and the public court filings.
Is this partisan? It should not be. Judges appointed by presidents of both parties made these findings, and the same safeguards will protect every American under every future administration.
This post is for general information and public education. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Many matters described are pending; allegations are not findings, grand-jury refusals are not findings of bad motive, and everyone mentioned is presumed innocent. Nothing here accuses any individual of a crime. The Biazzo Law Government Oversight Program is nonpartisan and does not endorse or oppose any candidate or party. Biazzo Law has publicly opposed certain nominations and filed amicus briefs in some related matters.




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